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Abstract
The game-theoretic risk management framework put forth in the precur-
sor work “Towards a Theory of Games with Payoffs that are Probability-
Distributions” ( arXiv:1506.07368 [q-fin.EC]) is herein extended by algorith-
mic details on how to compute equilibria in games where the payoffs are
probability distributions. Our approach is “data driven” in the sense that
we assume empirical data (measurements, simulation, etc.) to be available
that can be compiled into distribution models, which are suitable for efficient
decisions about preferences, and setting up and solving games using these as
payoffs. While preferences among distributions turn out to be quite sim-
ple if nonparametric methods (kernel density estimates) are used, computing
Nash-equilibria in games using such models is discovered as inefficient (if not
impossible). In fact, we give a counterexample in which fictitious play fails
to converge for the (specifically unfortunate) choice of payoff distributions in
the game, and introduce a suitable tail approximation of the payoff densities
to tackle the issue. The overall procedure is essentially a modified version of
fictitious play, and is herein described for standard and multicriteria games,
to iteratively deliver an (approximate) Nash-equilibrium.
∗Universita¨t Klagenfurt, Institute of Applied Informatics, System Security Group, Universita¨tsstrasse
65-67, 9020 Klagenfurt, Austria. This work has been done in the course of consultancy for the EU
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1 Introduction
Having laid the theoretical foundations in part one of this research (see [6]), we now
carry on describing the algorithmic aspects and implementation notes for computing
risk assurances on concrete games with distributions as payoffs.
We start with a discussion on how to construct distributions from data in a way
that is suitable for efficiently deciding -preferences among the empirical distribution
estimates. In a nutshell, the -relation as defined in [6] is as follows: assume that R1, R2
describe the losses as bounded quantities between 1 and some finite maximum (bounded
support), and let them have absolutely continuous measures w.r.t. the Lebesgue or
counting measure (assumption 1.3 in [6]).
Definition 1.1 (Preference Relation over Probability Distributions) Let R1, R2
be two bounded random variables ≥ 1, whose distributions are F1, F2. Write mRi(k) for
the k-th moment of Ri. We prefer F1 over F2, written as
F1  F2 :⇐⇒ ∃K ∈ N s.t. ∀k ≥ K : mR1(k) ≤ mR2(k) (1)
Strict preference of F1 over F2 is denoted and defined as
F1 ≺ F2 :⇐⇒ ∃K ∈ N s.t. ∀k ≥ K : mR1(k) < mR2(k)
Likewise, we define F1 ≡ F2 ⇐⇒ (F1  F2) ∧ (F2  F1).
Observe that ≡ does not mean an identity (in the sense of equality) between F1 and F2.
Concrete algorithms are given for estimating continuous distribution models (section
2.1), and on how to compare the following pairs:
• two continuous distributions with finite support (section 2) or infinite support
(section 2.4).
• continuous distribution vs. crisp number (section 2.3).
Chapter 3 is devoted to algorithms for computing multi-goal security strategies. It
opens with a discussion on how to carry over conventional fictitious play to ∗R for one
security goal (section 3.1), highlighting several nontrivial pitfalls that must be avoided
in a practical implementation. The full algorithm is developed along a sequence of
subsections, culminating in the final description for the one-dimensional case in section
3.1. The generalization of the algorithm to multicriteria distributions is derived on these
grounds in section 3.5.
The second major aspect of this work is computing security strategies in multi-criteria
games. These can be shown to correspond to Nash-equilibria in properly transformed
games, however, their computation is somewhat more involved than in the real-valued
case. For convenience of the reader, we review the definition of multi-goal security
strategies in section 3, after having highlighted the practical and theoretical obstacles in
computing (general) Nash-equilibria in the special kind of games that we consider. This
discussion is subject of sections 3.2 and 3.3.
3
2 Comparing Distributions Efficiently
This section is devoted to special cases of distribution models and how to compare them.
In many cases, we can avoid computing moment sequences, such as when the distribution
can be approximated or has compact support. The latter can be assured in kernel density
estimations using the Epanechnikov kernel, which is the first case discussed now.
2.1 Estimating Payoff Distributions from Simulations
In light of assuming bounded supports for all payoff distributions (see the introduction
or [8]), it is useful to estimate payoff distributions from data sets in a way that preserves
compactness of the support and continuity of the resulting distribution. To this end, we
can construct a standard kernel density estimator upon a kernel with compact support,
such as the Epanechnikov kernel
k(x) :=
{
3
4(1− x2), |x| ≤ 1
0, otherwise,
(2)
plotted in figure 1.
Let N = {x1, . . . , xn} ⊂ R be a sample of n real-valued simulation results, all of which
have been harvested under a fixed (i.e., constant) configuration of choices (for example,
strategies of all players in the game under consideration).
Nadaraya’s theorem then assures uniform convergence of the kernel density estimator
fˆ(x) =
1
n · h
n∑
i=1
k
(
xi − x
h
)
, (3)
towards the unknown payoff distribution density dF/dx, provided that the latter is
uniformly continuous, and the bandwidth parameter h is set to h := c ·n−α for constants
c > 0 and 0 < α < 12 . Practical heuristics (rules of thumb) are available and implemented
in various software packages, like R [5].
While this choice is convenient for evaluating the -relation, computing equilibria
requires a different choice for the kernel function, which will be the Gaussian kernel (or
any kernel with infinite support). We go into details later in section 3.2 and afterwards.
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Figure 5: Plot of the Epanechnikov kernel
II.3. Comparing Distributions Efficiently
This section is devoted to special cases of distribution models and how to compare them.
In many cases, we can avoid computing moment sequences, such as when the distribution
can be approximated or has compact support. The latter can be assured in kernel density
estimations using the Epanechnikov kernel, which is the first case discussed now.
II.3.1. Epanechnikov Kernel Density Models
Given two kernel density estimates by using their hyperreal representatives is easy, and
made precise in the following procedure:
Let fˆ1, fˆ2 be two kernel density estimates (22), constructed from sample sets of sizes
n1, n2, with respective bandwidths h1, h2. Furthermore, let us assume that the kernel
has compact support. Let the samples be in ascending order (that can be arbitrary for
ties), i.e., the densities fˆ1, fˆ2 are constructed from the values x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn1 and
y1 ≤ y2 ≤ . . . ≤ yn2 . To decide which one of fˆ1, fˆ2 is preferred over the other, it suffices
to look at the largest value in each sample. Here, we distinguish the following cases:
• If xn1 + h1 < yn2 + h2, then fˆ1 ≺ fˆ2.
• If yn2 + h2 < xn1 + h1, then fˆ2 ≺ fˆ1.
• Otherwise, we must have xn1 + h1 = yn2 + h2, in which case we go on comparing
as follows:
– If xn1 < yn2 , then fˆ1 ≺ fˆ2
– If yn2 < xn1 , then fˆ2 ≺ fˆ1
– Otherwise, we must have xn1 = xn2 , and therefore also h1 = h2. In that case,
we discard the pair xn1 , yn2 and repeat the comparison procedure on the next
samples xn1−1, yn2−1 in decreasing order on both lists.
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Figure 1: Plot of the Epanechnikov kernel
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2.2 Comparing Kernel Density Models
Given two kernel density estimates by using their hyperreal representatives is easy, and
made precise in the following procedure (cf. [7]):
Let fˆ1, fˆ2 be two kernel density estimates (3), constructed from sample sets of sizes
n1, n2, with respective bandwidths h1, h2. Furthermore, let us assume that the kernel has
compact support, which is – for example – automatically satisfied for the Epanechnikov
kernel. Let the samples be in ascending order (that can be arbitrary for ties), i.e., the
densities fˆ1, fˆ2 are constructed from the values x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn1 and y1 ≤ y2 ≤ · · · ≤
yn2 . To decide which one of fˆ1, fˆ2 is preferred over the other, it suffices to look at the
largest value in each sample. Here, we distinguish the following cases:
• If xn1 + h1 < yn2 + h2, then fˆ1 ≺ fˆ2.
• If yn2 + h2 < xn1 + h1, then fˆ2 ≺ fˆ1.
• Otherwise, we must have xn1 + h1 = yn2 + h2, in which case we go on comparing
as follows:
– If xn1 < yn2 , then fˆ1 ≺ fˆ2
– If yn2 < xn1 , then fˆ2 ≺ fˆ1
– Otherwise, we must have xn1 = yn2 , and therefore also h1 = h2. In that case,
we discard the pair xn1 , yn2 and repeat the comparison procedure on the next
samples xn1−1, yn2−1 in decreasing order on both lists.
The effort for sorting then makes the above procedure decide the ≺-relation with com-
plexity O(n log n), where n = max {n1, n2}.
The correctness of this method is immediately evident upon the fact that any two
distinct points zi 6= zj in a sequence of samples contribute to the (respective) density
using bandwidth h on a range [z − h, z + h], where z ∈ {zi, zj}. A subtle issue arises in
the case of categorial data (say, if the outcome is rated as “low”, “medium”, “high”), for
which identical samples may accumulate at identical positions. In this case, the density
with less samples in the higher range will be preferred. In the above process, this will
cause identical samples to be removed until either. . .
• . . . exactly one of the distributions has no further samples at position z, which
makes this preferred (since the other distribution assigns a nonzero likelihood to
larger damage possibilities), or
• . . . both distributions have an equal amount of probability mass on z, in which
case the respective density functions are identical and the difference between the
densities is zero.
In any case, this means that we can ultimately assume zi 6= zj , so that the respective
intervals are not congruent. W.l.o.g., assume zi < zj , then the density is strictly positive
on the range [zj − h, zj + h] \ [zi − h, zi + h], whereas it vanishes outside the interval.
Now, apply this reasoning to two densities, having their shapes on the right end of their
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support being defined by the kernels centered around the maximum value in either data
sample. Depending on the bandwidth in each estimator and the location of the interval,
it remains to determine which density reaches farther out and remains positive when the
other density vanishes. The arguments in the proof of [6, lemma 2.4] exhibit that the
distribution whose support strictly overlaps the other that will have its moments grow
faster than the distribution that it is compared to. Hence, the preference relation ≺ can
be decided upon checking which density estimate has the longer tail.
To improve flexibility in this regard, let us look at mixture distribution models, which
are distribution functions whose density is a mix of several (simpler) density functions,
i.e.,
fmix(x) =
n∑
i=1
ωifi(x), where
n∑
i=1
ωi = 1.
From the mix of densities, the mixed distribution is instantly discovered to be
Fmix(x) =
n∑
i=1
ωiFi(x)
Likewise, the moments of X ∼ Fmix satisfy
E
(
Xk
)
=
∫ ∞
0
xkfmix(x)dx =
n∑
i=1
ωiE
(
Xki
)
, where Xi ∼ Fi (4)
From the last identity, we instantly obtain that for any two distributions F1  F2 and
G1  G2, preference holds for the mix in the same way, i.e. (by induction), if Fi  Gi
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then Fmix  Gmix, with the mixtures defined as above.
Mixture distribution models are particularly handy as they can be shown to approxi-
mate any distribution up to arbitrary precision.
Having mixtures as models, it is interesting to see what happens if the mixture is
such that components compare alternatingly. In other words, let F1 = ω1G1 +ω2G2 and
F2 = ω
′
1H1 + ω
′
2H2, where G1  H1 but G2  H2.
Here, we can take advantage of the hyperreal representation of distributions which
allows us to do arithmetics “as usual”, whereas it must strictly be emphasized that
the result of any such arithmetics no longer represents a valid distribution (nor is the
arithmetic done here in any way statistically meaningful; it is a mere vehicle towards
the sought conclusion).
More specifically, recall that any of the above distributions is represented by a sequence
of moments, and the comparison is based on which sequence grows faster than the other.
This means that by virtue of (4) and by letting the sequences (g1,n)n∈N, (g2,n)n∈N,
(h1,n)n∈N and (h2,n)n∈N represent the distributions G1, G2, H1 and H2, we end up look-
ing at the limit
a = lim
n→∞
[
(ω1g1,n + ω2g2,n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
represents F1
− (ω′1h1,n + ω′2h2,n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
represents F2
]
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If a ≤ 0 then F1  F2, with strict preference if a < 0. Otherwise, we have F1  F2,
likewise with strict preference. More detailed criteria call for additional hypotheses,
such as the existence of closed-form expressions for the involved moments. Many special
cases, however, are easy to decide, such as mixes of distributions with compact support.
In the case of finite mixtures, Fmix is supported on
⋃n
i=1 supp(Fi), and has itself compact
support. Then, all the previously given criteria apply. Hence, the above limit expression
comes into play when comparing distributions with infinite support, and calls for a
full-fledged analysis only if approximations (by truncating the distributions) are not
reasonable.
2.3 Comparing Deterministic to Random Variables
Let a ∈ R be a deterministic outcome of an action, and let Y ∼ F be a random variable
with non-degenerate distribution supported on Ω = [0, b] whose density is f . We know
that a yields a moment sequence (ak)k∈N. A comparison to Y is easy in every of the
three possible cases:
1. If a < b, then a  Y : to see this, choose ε < (b− a)/3 so that f is strictly positive
on a compact set [b− ε, b− 2ε] (note that such a set must exist as f is continuous
and the support ranges until b). We can lower-bound the k-th moment of Y as∫ b
0
ykf(y)dy ≥
(
inf
[b−2ε,b−ε]
f
)
·
∫ b−ε
b−2ε
ykdy
=
1
k + 1
[
(b− ε)k+1 − (b− 2ε)k+1
]
.
Note that the infimum is positive as f is strictly positive on the compact set
[b − 2ε, b − ε]. The lower bound is essentially an exponential function to a base
larger than a, since b− 2ε > a, and thus (ultimately) grows faster than ak.
2. If a > b, then Y  a, since Y – in any possible realization – leads to strictly less
damage than a. The formal argument is now based on an upper bound to the
moments, which can be derived as follows:∫ b
0
ykf(y)dy ≤ (sup
[0,b]
f) ·
∫ b
0
ykdy = (sup
[0,b]
f)
1
k + 1
bk+1.
It is easy to see that for k →∞, this function grows slower than ak as a > b, which
leads to the comparison result.
3. If a = b, then we apply the mean-value theorem to the integral occurring in
E
(
Y k
)
=
∫ a
0 y
kf(y)dy to obtain an ξ ∈ [0, a] for which
E
(
Y k
)
= ξk
∫ a
0
f(y)dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= ξk ≤ ak
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for all k. Hence, Y  a in that case. An intuitive explanation is obtained from the
fact that Y may assign positive likelihood to events with less damage as a, whereas
a deterministic outcome is always larger or equal to anything that Y can deliver.
2.4 Distributions with Infinite Support
This case is difficult in general, but simple special cases may occur, for example, if
we compare a distribution with compact support to one with infinite support (such
as extreme value distributions or ones with long or fat tails). Then, the compactly
supported distribution is always preferred, by the same argument as used above (and in
the proof of the invariance of  w.r.t. the ultrafilter used to construct ∗R; see [6, lemma
2.4]).
The unfortunate occasions are those where:
• both distributions have infinite support, and
• neither [6, Lemma 2.7] nor any direct criteria (such as eq. (13) in [6]) apply, and
• an approximation cannot be done (for whatever reason).
Then we have to work out the moment sequences explicitly. This situation is indeed
problematic, as without assuming bounded supports, we can neither guarantee existence
nor divergence of the two moment sequences.
Appropriate examples illustrating this problem can easily be constructed by defining
distributions with alternating moments from the representation by the Taylor-series
expansion of the characteristic function (see [6] for an example).
As was explained in [6], however, explained that extreme value distributions strictly
compare to one other depending depending on their parameterizations, by applying
lemma the criteria derived in [6]. Mixes of such distributions can perhaps replace an
otherwise unhandy model.
2.5 On Paradoxical Comparisons and Finding Good Approximations
In part one of this report, finite approximations to distributions with infinite support
were proposed to fit these into our preference relation. It turns out, however, that
even distributions with finite support may lead to paradoxical and unexpected results in
terms of -preference. That is, we would in any case prefer the distribution with smaller
support, but this is not necessarily the one giving us less damage in most of the cases.
To illustrate the problem, consider the two distributions plotted in figure 2 (where the
densities have been scaled only to properly visualize the issue). Observe that F2 assigns
all its mass around larger damage, while F1 generally gives much lower damages except
for rare cases that exceed the events that can occur under F2. These rare cases, however,
extend beyond the support of distribution F1, which based on the characterization by a
sequence of would clearly let us prefer F2 over F1 (Figure 2a). Indeed, it is easy to see
that such a result is not what we would expect or want in practice.
8
(a) Distributions F2  F1 (b) Truncated distributions Fˆ1  Fˆ2
Figure 2: Correcting Paradoxical Comparisons by Quantile-Based Approximations [7]
Truncating the distributions properly can, however, easily fix the issue. To this end,
let α > 0 be a chosen and fixed threshold and cut off each distribution as soon as it
exceeds 1− α of its mass. Precisely, we could thus cut off a distribution at its (1− α)-
quantile, denoted as q1−α = F−1(1 − α) (where F−1 is the inverse of the distribution
function; called the quantile function). Now, reconsider the previous situation with F1
and F2, now being truncated properly (Figure 2b). Since both distributions’ supports
extend only to the point when they have assigned 95% of their mass, it is instantly
revealed that F2 does so much earlier than F1, hence making F2 clearly the preferred
option here. The price of this fix is the acceptance of events that are less likely than α
under F2, which can – in a fraction of α among all possible cases – give more damage
than F1 could ever do.
In other words, common approximations based on a risk acceptance threshold α, as
described above, can avoid paradoxical preferences. The assertion of theorem 2.14 in
[6] would then fail in claiming that extreme events are less likely under the preferred
distribution. The assertion, however, remains valid in a fraction of (1− α)% of cases, if
we cut off the distributions.
3 Computing Multi-Goal Security Strategies (MGSS)
Roughly speaking, the basic algorithm to compute MGSS in the sense of [6, Def.4.1]
(generalizing precursor work in [9]). For the definition, let F ⊆∗ R be a subset of
the hyperreals ∗R that represent probability distributions that are supported within a
compact subset of [1, a] for some real number a. For two n-dimensional vectors x =
(x1, . . . , xn),y = (y1, . . . , yn), we write x 1 y, if an index i exists for which xi  yi
(irrespectively of what the other entries do).
Definition 3.1 (Multi-Goal Security Strategy with Assurance)
A strategy p∗ ∈ S1 in a two-person multi-criteria game with mixed strategy spaces S1, S2.
Let player 1’s have a continuous payoff u1 : S1×S2→Fd. A Multi-Goal Security Strategy
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with Assurance (MGSS) with assurance is a pair (v,x∗), where v = (V1, . . . , Vd) ∈ Fd
is vector of distributions and x∗ ∈ S1, if two criteria are met:
Axiom 1: Assurance The values in v are the component-wise guaranteed payoff for
player 1, i.e. for all components i, we have
Vi  u(i)1 (p∗, q) ∀q ∈ S2, (5)
with ≡-equality being achieved by at least one choice qi ∈ S2.
Axiom 2: Efficiency At least one assurance becomes void if player 1 deviates from p∗
by playing p 6= p∗. In that case, some qp ∈ S2 exists (that depends on p) such that
u1(p, qp) 1 v. (6)
To practically compute MGSS, we actually “simulate” a gameplay in which both
players (honest defender and the full set of adversaries, each of which corresponds to
another security goal), record each others actions and optimize their choices w.r.t. the
empirical distributions1.
3.1 The case of only one security goal
We start with the simpler case in which the MGSS is one-dimensional. This case boils
down to an application of regular fictitious play to a “standard” zero-sum game. The
general case of d > 1 goals can easily be reduced to the one-dimensional case, as we will
show in section 3.5.
For the current matter, it suffices to decide upon one’s best action, given that the
others choose their actions with known probabilities. This is nothing else than a mix of
distributions that we need to compare to our own strategy (details of how this can be
done have been discussed before).
To exactly specify a suitable fictitious play (FP) algorithm, we will step-by-step trans-
fer a MATLAB implementation of a regular FP algorithm as described in [13] to our
modified setting. Towards proving correctness of the algorithm in our setting, the hy-
perreal numbers will turn out useful.
Listing 1: Fictitious play in MATLAB for a zero-sum game with payoff matrixA ∈ Rn×m
1 % standard f i c t i t i o u s play in an two person
2 % zero sum (mxn)−matrix game with
3 % payo f f matrix A. The computation d e l i v e r s
4 % an approximate Nash equ i l i b r i um
5 % over i t e ra t i onCount s t ep s ( must be s e t in advance )
6 [m n ] = s i z e (A) ;
7 x = ze ro s (1 , m) ;
8 y = ze ro s (1 , n ) ;
9 [ vmin , r ] = max( min (A’ ) ) ;
1in the literature, this is called a belief sequence.
10
10 [ vmax , c ] = min (max(A) ) ;
11 U = A( : , r ) ;
12 V = ze ro s (1 , n ) ;
13 y ( c ) = y ( c ) + 1 ;
14 f o r i = 1 : i t e rat ionCount−1
15 [ bestU , r ] = max(U) ; % best re sponse to p laye r 2 ’ s a c t i o n s
16 x ( r ) = x ( r ) + 1 ; % update p laye r 1 ’ s behavior
17 V = V + A( r , : ) ; % record p laye r 1 ’ s payo f f
18 vmax = min ( bestU / i , vmax) ; % update the upper bound to v
19 [ bestV , c ] = min (V) ; % best re sponse to p laye r 1 ’ s a c t i o n s
20 y ( c ) = y ( c ) + 1 ; % update p laye r 2 ’ s behavior
21 U = U + A( : , c ) ; % record p laye r 2 ’ s payo f f
22 vmin = max( bestV / i , vmin ) ; % update the lower bound to v
23 end
24 x = x / sum( x ) ; % abso lu te f r e q u e n c i e s −> p r o b a b i l i t i e s
25 y = y / sum( y ) ;
26 v = x∗A∗y ’ ; % average payo f f ( est imated )
Lines 6, . . . , 13 in the algorithm cover matters of initialization, where we determine the
size of the payoff structure (n×m being assumed here), and initialize the solution vectors
x and y to all zero. Upon termination of the algorithm, x and y will approximate the
MGSS p∗ and an optimal adversarial mixed strategy q∗.
Note that our problem is to minimize player 1’s loss, while player 2 (adversary) at-
tempts to maximize the damage. This is essentially the opposite of what is implemented
in listing 1, so that our first modification is to swap all calls to min and max in the entire
algorithm (lines 9 . . . 23). The rest of the algorithm remains unchanged.
Now for the for-loop (lines 14 . . . 23): during the initialization phase, the FP algorithm
chooses an arbitrary initial pure strategy 1 ≤ i1 ≤ n for player 1 (done in lines 9 and 10
of listing 1). From then on, the players alternatingly choose their next pure strategies
as a best reply assuming that the other player selects at random from her/his previous
choices. That is, let the history of player 1’s (row-player) moves be r1, . . . , rk over the
past k iterations of FP, then player 2 (column-player) chooses his strategy ck so as to
minimize the average payoff
ck = argmin
j∈PS2
1
k
k∑
`=1
ai`,j , (7)
when the payoff matrix is A = (ai,j)
n,m
i,j=1. Let this choice be ck+1, then likewise, player
1 would in the next round choose rk+1 to maximize the average outcome
rk+1 = argmax
i∈PS1
1
k
k∑
`=1
ai,j` . (8)
These alternating choices are made in lines 15. . . 17 and 19. . . 21 in the MATLAB code.
Lines 16 and 20 simply count so-far played moves in a vector, which, after normalization,
will be the sought approximation to the Nash-equilibrium (p∗, q∗).
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In light of the fact that our games pay the players in terms of entire probability
distributions rather than numeric values, line 17 and line 21 deserve a closer look: Indeed,
the division by the iteration count in lines 18 and 22 is nothing else than the factor 1/k
appearing in (7) and (8), so that both expressions
1
k
k∑
`=1
Fi`,j , and
1
k
k∑
`=1
Fi,j` (9)
yield valid distribution functions again, when we use our payoff distribution matrix
A = (Fij) instead of real values. As was previously noticed in equation (4) already, the
corresponding hyperreal representation of a weighted sum 1k
∑k
`=1 Fi`,j is identical to the
correspondingly weighted sum of hyperreal representations of each term (independently
of the ultrafilter upon which the hyperreal space ∗R was constructed). In other words,
working with distributions in (7) and (8) amounts to leaving the algorithm exactly
unchanged, except for letting it operate on hyperreal numbers instead of real numbers
to represent the payoffs. By the transfer principle [10], convergence of the algorithm
identically holds in the space of hyperreals as it does in the real numbers (since the
respective statements are all in first-order logic). It follows that the resulting algorithm
pointwise adds distribution or density functions in lines 17 and 21, and it divides by
the iteration count as it would divide a standard real number (only, it is a distribution
function in our case). This is permitted, since the pointwise scaling of a distribution
function by a real value amounts to scaling the respective hyperreal number (moment
sequence) element-wise by the same factor.
Convergence of the algorithm then implies that the approximations x and y will even-
tually approximate an equilibrium in the -sense (asymptotically). Since the outcome
of the algorithm over the reals is an approximation to a Nash-equilibrium (x∗,y∗) w.r.t.
the payoff being xTAy, the outcome of our algorithm is a hyperreal pair (x∗,y∗) that
forms an equilibrium for the payoff function xTAy, which, however, equals the sought
overall distribution of the damage R,
Pr(R ≤ r) = (F (p, q))(r) =
∑
i,j
Fij(r) · pi · qj , (10)
with independent choices by both players.
It is important to notice the difference of this outcome to that of standard game-theory,
where a “repeated game” means something essentially different than here:
• In standard game-theory, the players would choose their payoffs to maximize their
long-run average over infinitely many repetitions of the game.
• In our setting, as implied by (10), the Nash-equilibrium optimizes the game’s
overall payoff distribution for a single round. That is, this consideration is a single-
shot, as opposed to conventional games, where we benefit only in the long-run from
playing the equilibrium.
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The whole trick is equation (10) resembling a long-run average payoff for a conventional
game, when the strategy choices are made independently. Since our distributions boil
down to mere hyperreal numbers in the space F ⊂ R∞/U , convergence there is inherited
from the convergence of regular FP over the reals. More importantly, observe that the
FP algorithm merely adds and scales distributions (by a real valued factor), which is
doable without any explicit ultrafilter U . Thus, regular FP can be applied seemingly
without change to our setting, except for the min- and max-functions being computed
w.r.t. -relation (and the criteria as specified above). Alas, this impression will turn
out to be practically flawed (example 3.4).
Let us now turn to the full pseudocode-specification of fictitious play in our modified
setting, which is algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Fictitious Play
Require: an (n×m)-matrix A of payoff distributions A = (Fij)
Ensure: an approximation (x,y) of an equilibrium pair (p∗, q∗) and a two distribu-
tions vlow, vup so that vlow  F (p∗, q∗)  vup. Here, F (p∗, q∗)(r) = Pr(R ≤ r) =∑
i,j Fij(r) · p∗i q∗j .
1: initialize x← 0 ∈ Rn, and y ← 0 ∈ Rm
2: vlow ← the -minimum over all column-maxima
3: r ←the row index giving vlow
4: vup ← the -maximum over all row-minima
5: c← the column index giving vup
6: u← (F1,c, . . . , Fn,c)
7: yc ← yc + 1 . y = (y1, . . . , ym)
8: v ← 0 . initialize v with m functions that are zero everywhere
9: for k = 1, 2, . . . do
10: u∗ ← the -minimum of u
11: r ← the index of u∗ in u
12: vup ← the -maximum of {u∗/k, vup} . pointwise scaling of the distribution u∗
13: v ← v + (Fr,1, . . . , Fr,m) . pointwise addition of functions
14: xr ← xr + 1 . x = (x1, . . . , xn)
15: v∗ ← the -maximum of v
16: c← the index of v∗ in v
17: vlow ← the -minimum of {v∗/k, vlow} . pointwise scaling of the distribution v∗
18: u← u+ (F1,c, . . . , Fn,c) . pointwise addition of functions
19: yc ← yc + 1 . y = (y1, . . . , ym)
20: exit the loop upon convergence . concrete condition given below
21: end for
22: Normalize x,y to unit total sum . turn x,y into probability distributions.
23: return p∗ ← x, q∗ ← y, and F (p∗, q∗)←∑i,j Fij(r) · xi · yj . ≈ (p∗)TAq∗
Convergence of algorithm 1 is inherited from the known convergence results in the
standard setting of fictitious play, as shown in listing 1. Precisely, we have the following
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result, originally proven by J.Robinson [11]. Our version here is an adapted compilation
of proposition 2.2 and proposition 2.3 in [2, chapter 2]:
Theorem 3.2 Under fictitious play in ∗R, the empirical distributions converge (along
an unboundedly growing sequence of hyperreal integers), if the game is zero-sum.
Remark 3.3 The zero-sum assumption in theorem 3.2 needs some elaboration here:
let A be the original payoff structure with all distribution-valued entries. Let A be its
hyperreal representation (by replacing each distribution by its representative moment
sequence). Then, a zero-sum game – as considered in theorem 3.2 – would assign the
payoffs (A,−A), in which player 2’s structure no longer corresponds to a valid matrix of
probability distributions. However, FP merely means the players choosing their moves as
a best response to the so-far recorded history of strategies. For player 2, -maximizing
his payoff on −A is the same as  −minimizing the payoff on A by the properties of
the ordering on the hyperreals. Thus, his choices are indeed based on a valid probability
distribution matrix.
We stress that theorem 3.2 talks about the convergence of empirical distributions,
rather than the convergence of the game’s value only (which is the somewhat weaker
statement found in [11]). The importance of this insight for us lies in the convergence
criterion that it delivers:
Convergence criterion for algorithm 1, line 20: let xk denote the empirical
absolute frequencies of strategy choices, as recorded by algorithm 1 in line
14. Fix any ε > 0 and some vector-norm ‖·‖ on Rn, and terminate the
algorithm as soon as 1k ‖xk+1 − xk‖ < ε.
Alternative convergence criteria, say on the difference |vup − vlow| are also found in the
literature, but are not applicable to our setting here: to see why, recall that both, vup and
vlow are probability distributions, and convergence |vup − vlow| → 0 holds in a hyperreal
sense (by an application of the transfer principle, or more generally,  Los´’s theorem [1]).
Precisely, the statement would be the following: for every hyperreal ε > 0 there is a
number K such that
∣∣∣v(k)up − v(k)low∣∣∣ < ε for all hyperreal k ≥ K, where v(k)up , v(k)low denote
the values in the k-th iteration of the algorithm.
An inspection of Jane Robinson’s original convergence proof [11] shows that despite all
statements transfer to the hyperreal setting (consistently with  Los´’s theorem), conver-
gence kicks in beyond an integer limit that depends on the largest entry in the matrix.
More specifically, given ε > 0 and letting t ∈ N be an iteration counter, Robinson’s proof
(cf. lemma 4 in [11]) establishes at some point that maxv(t)−minu(t) < ε conditional
on
t ≥ 8 · a · t∗/ε, (11)
based on an induction argument that delivers t∗ through the induction hypothesis. The
crucial point here is the number a, which is the absolute value of the largest element
in the payoff-matrix. Now, even if t were (at some point in the induction) a finite
integer, (11) asserts a hyperreal lower bound for t. By our construction, a represents
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a probability distribution with a diverging moment-sequence (that is a) and thus an
infinite hyperreal number. Consequently, the number of iterations until convergence is
a hyperreal and infinite integer. In other words, convergence of algorithm (1), when
implemented in plain form over the hyperreals, cannot converge for a standard integer
for-loop (in line 9).
3.2 Assuring Convergence
The problem can be made visible even on a less abstract level, by considering an in-
termediate step in the algorithm that has established mixtures u and v as multimodal
distributions. Consider the intermediate values computed by algorithm 1, using the
following concrete example for illustration.
Example 3.4 (Convergence failure of plain FP implementations) We construct
a 2× 2-game with payoffs being Epanechnikov density functions centered around the val-
ues
A =
(
2 5
3 1
)
The payoff structure in our game is thus a 2× 2-matrix of functions,
1 2 3 4 5
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
F11
1 2 3 4 5
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
F12
1 2 3 4 5
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
F21
1 2 3 4 5
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
F22
It is easy to compute the Nash-equilibrium for the exact matrix A as v(A) = 2.6,
returned by the mixed equilibrium strategies p∗ = (0.4, 0.6) and q∗ = (0.8, 0.2) for both
players. Since our setting shall merely capture our uncertainty about the payoffs, we
would thus naturally expect a somewhat similar result when working on the payoff dis-
tributions. Unfortunately, however, algorithm 1 will not produce this expected answer,
if it is implemented without care.
After a few iterations, the algorithm gets stuck in always choosing the first row for
player 1, since vup is always -preferable over u∗/k, which is immediately obvious from
plotting the two distributions:
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1 2 3 4 5
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
3.
0
vup

1 2 3 4 5
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
u∗/k
Observe that choosing the upper row in the payoff structure adds probability mass
to lower damages, but leaves the tail of the distribution unchanged. Thus, although the
overall damage accumulates, this effect is not noticeable by the -relation. Consequently,
the algorithm will counterintuitively come to the conclusion that p = (0, 1) is a pure
equilibrium, which is definitely not meaningful.
Let us now make the intuition developed in example 3.4 more rigorous to find the
solution for the problem.
Recall that the bounds are updated (lines 12 and 17 in algorithm 1) when u∗/k or
v∗/k are preferable over the current bounds. Now, given choices of actions whose payoff
distribution has vanishing support at the right end of the relevant interval (choices u∗
and v∗), the pointwise scale and accumulation of distributions will make 1/k · u∗ always
larger than vup, simply because vup assigns no mass to regions where u
∗ has a strictly
positive density. This strict positivity is clearly retained upon any scaling by 1/k, no
matter how large k is. Thus, the algorithm gets stuck with the same action being chosen
once and forever, since adding -smaller payoff distributions to the long-run average
u∗/k will never make this payoff less than vup, and thus never cause an update to this
value. The analogous effect prevents updates to vlow, and the algorithm will end up with
pure equilibria and thus never converge to a practically meaningful result.
A closer look at the example, however, also reveals the way out of the dilemma: the
algorithm hangs because the cumulative sum adds up probability densities pointwise and
the comparison is done at the tails of the distribution only. Thus, any change outside
the tail region is not noticed when the -relation is evaluated, thus never triggering
any updates to vup and vlow. Obviously, the effect disappears if all distributions in the
payoff structure have full support over the interval of interest, so that any change to
the cumulative payoff is “noticeable everywhere”, especially at the tail region of the
distribution.
This is easily accomplished by replacing the Epanechnikov-kernels by Gaussian kernels
in the estimator (3), and truncating the kernel density estimates fˆ at a fixed (chosen)
point; as recommended already in section 2.5.
To establish the correctness of this fix, we must assure convergence of fictitious play
under these new payoff structures. To this end, we will resort to the original version of
fictitious play being done over R. In fact, we will construct a real-valued approxima-
tion of the hyperreal representation of the payoff structure, so that we can work with
standard FP again. The transition from the hyperreal representation back to a real-
valued representation is approximative in the sense that we will represent a hyperreal
value/distribution F by a real value y(F ), to be defined later, in an -order-preserving
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a
(a) f(a) < g(a)⇒ f  g
g
f
a
g′(a)
f ′(a)
(b) (f(a) = g(a) ∧ −f ′(a) < −g′(a))⇒ f  g
Figure 3: Comparing tails using function values and derivatives
fashion.
Let fˆ be a Gaussian kernel density estimator for a payoff distribution F (more pre-
cisely, its density function), which is strictly positive on the entire interval Ω = [0, a].
Since all payoff densities are strictly positive at a, we first observe that for any two
densities f1, f2, we have
fˆ1(a) < fˆ2(a) implies fˆ1  fˆ2.
Otherwise, if f1(a) = f2(a) (the >-case is analogous as before), then the first order
derivative may tip the scale in the sense that under equality of the densities at x = a,
fˆ ′1(a) > fˆ
′
2(a) implies fˆ1  fˆ2.
Upon equality of values and slopes, the second order derivative makes the decision, since
in that case,
fˆ ′′1 (a) < fˆ
′′
2 (a) implies fˆ1  fˆ2,
and so on. All these three concrete cases are most easily visualized graphically (see
Figure 3 for the first two cases), and our next step is making this so far intuitive criterion
rigorous. For that matter, recall that the lexicographical order on two (infinite) sequences
a = (an)n∈N and b = (bn)n∈N. This ordering is denoted as <lex and calls a <lex b if
a1 < b1. If a1 = b1, then a <lex b if a2 < b2, and so on. For strings (whether finite
or not), the lexicographical order is simply the alphabetical order. The lexicographical
less-or-equal ≤lex order is defined in the obvious way.
Lemma 3.5 Let f, g ∈ C∞([0, a]) for a real value a > 0 be probability density functions.
If
((−1)k · f (k)(a))k∈N <lex ((−1)k · g(k)(a))k∈N,
then f  g.
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Thus, it suffices to lexicographically compare the sequence of derivatives with alternating
sign-change to decide which distribution is the preferred one.
Proof (of lemma 3.5). The argument is based on our intuition above, and will look for
which distribution is below the other in a right neighborhood of a. To simplify matters,
however, let us “mirror” the functions around the vertical line at x = a and look for which
of f(x), g(x) grows faster when x becomes larger than a, using an induction argument
on the derivative order k. Clearly, whichever function grows slower for x ≥ a in the
mirrored view is the -preferable one. Furthermore, we may assume a = 0 without
loss of generality (as this is only a shift along the horizontal line). For k = 0, we have
f(0) < g(0) clearly implying that f  g, since the continuity implies that the relation
holds in an entire neighborhood [0, ε) for some ε > 0. Thus, the induction start is
accomplished.
For the induction step, assume that f (i)(0) = g(i)(0) for all i < k, f (k)(0) < g(k)(0),
and that there is some ε > 0 so that f (k)(x) < g(k)(x) is satisfied for all 0 ≤ x < ε. Take
any such x and observe that
0 >
∫ x
0
(
f (k)(t)− g(k)(t)
)
dt = f (k−1)(x)− f (k−1)(0)−
[
g(k−1)(x)− g(k−1)(0)
]
= f (k−1)(x)− g(k−1)(x),
since f (k−1)(0) = g(k−1)(0) by the induction hypothesis. Thus, f (k−1)(x) < g(k−1)(x),
and we can repeat the argument until k = 0 to conclude that f(x) < g(x) for all
x ∈ [0, ε).
For returning to the original problem, we must only revert our so-far mirrored view
by considering f(−x), g(−x) in the above argument. The derivatives accordingly change
into d
k
dxk
f(−x) = (−1)kf (k)(x), and the proof is complete. 
Lemma 3.5 has a useful corollary, which establishes the sought order-preserving prop-
erty of the new sequences.
Corollary 3.6 For f ∈ C∞([0, a]) being a probability distribution supported on [0, a],
define y(f) := ((−1)kf (k)(a))n∈N. Then, for any two such distributions f, g, we have
f  g ⇐⇒ y(f) ≤lex y(g).
Proof. Let us consider the case when y(f) 6= y(g) first. If so, then f  g must necessarily
make y(f) ≤lex y(g); for otherwise, if y(f) >lex y(g), then lemma 3.5 would imply g ≺ f ,
a contradiction.
Conversely, if y(f) <lex y(g), then lemma 3.5 implies f  g directly.
When y(f) = y(g), then all derivatives are identical. This also means that f, g have
identical Taylor-series expansions, and are therefore identical functions. Thus, f ≡ g
consequently. 
The benefit of replacing an infinite sequence (a hyperreal number) by another infinite
sequence of derivatives lies in possibility to approximate the density at its tail in a
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way that gets more and more accurate, depending on how many terms we include in
the sequence. That is, we can easily resort to a Taylor-polynomial that approximates
the tail-behavior of the density functions up to any precision we like. Moreover, the
Gaussian density has the particular appeal of having all its distributions computable
in closed form expressions by Hermite-polynomials. The n-th such polynomial can be
constructed recursively as
Hn+1(x) := 2xHn(x)− 2nHn−1(x), with H0(x) = 1, H1(x) = 2x.
These are related to the n-th order derivative of the Gaussian density via the identity
(−1)nex
2
2
dn
dxn
e−
x2
2 = 2−
n
2Hn
(
x√
2
)
.
In R, the Hermite-polynomials can be computed by the orthopolynom package [4].
3.3 Numerical Aspects
Now, to ultimately fix the convergence issue of FP over the hyperreals, we apply corollary
3.6 on the truncated series of moments, or equivalently, to a t-th order Taylor-polynomial
fitted to the kernel densities under investigation.
However, two more aspects deserve attention:
• any floating point representation of the derivatives is inevitably subject of a round-
ing errors, say the machine precision εM > 0.
• the number of necessary terms in the Taylor-series expansion at x = a,
fˆ(x) = fˆ(a) +
∞∑
k=1
fˆ (k)(a)
k!
(x− a)k (12)
may grow too large to be practically feasible (see figure 4 for an approximation
that includes derivatives up to order 20 but is quite inaccurate near the origin
x = 0). However, given that we only need a good tail-approximation, the quality
of the approximation far from the end of the support may be practically negligible.
In other words, the result of the comparison remains somewhat insensitive against
approximation errors far from the tail.
The roundoff error can directly be computed from (12), since the approximate version
fˆε differs from fˆ by at most
max
x∈[0,a]
∣∣∣fˆ(x)− fˆε(x)∣∣∣ ≤ εM + ∞∑
k=1
εM
k!
ak = εM · ea,
and can thus be kept under control by keeping the roundoff error small, according to
the (known) value a (where all distributions are jointly truncated).
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Figure 4: Approximating a N(1, 1)-density at x = 4 by a Taylor polynomial of order 20
Given that all derivatives can (numerically) be represented with `-bit floating point
words in a suitable excess representation2, we can cast the (now finite) sequence y(f) :=
((−1)kf (k)(a))n∈N from corollary 3.6 into a real number by concatenating the bit repre-
sentations of the numbers into a new value
y(f) := f(a)‖ − f ′(a)‖f ′′(a)‖ − f ′′′(a)‖ . . . ‖(−1)tf (t)(a), (13)
where t is the number of derivatives used, ‖ denotes the bitstring concatenation, and
all entries are rounded floating point values (in excess representation). The representa-
tion of a density function f by a real number of the form (13) has its numerical order
(say between y(f), y(g)) being identical to the lexicographical order on the respective
sequences/strings (as the highest order bits determine the order, and upon equality, the
lower order bits come into play, etc.). Thus – in theory – we can safely use y(f) as an
approximate and order-preserving replacement for the density function f .
More importantly, the representation (13) is somewhat “retained” for mixed distri-
butions like (9), as algorithm 1 constructs: assume that in (13), all entries (−1)if (i)(a)
range within 0 ≤ ∣∣f (i)(a)∣∣ ≤ M for some constant M . This constant must exist, as it
is merely the maximum among all suprema that the derivatives up to order t attain on
the (compact) interval [0, a] (recall that our Gaussian kernel density estimator is con-
tinuously differentiable). Since the convex combination (9) of distributions by linearity
of the differentiation amounts to a convex combination of the respective derivatives, the
results must all stay within the same numeric range [−M,+M ], thus adding up and
averaging the payoffs does not create a “carry” from the part (−1)if (i)(a) into the left
neighboring part (−1)i−1f (i−1)(a) within the bitpattern of expression (13). Thus, the
representation remains valid also for the mixes (9) maintained over the execution of FP.
2There will be no need to implement such a representation in reality, as we require it only for our
theoretical arguments; however, an excess representation makes the numerical order identical to the
lexicographic order, provided that the sign bits are chosen suitably (i.e., a 0 indicating a negative
number, and 1 marking a positive number).
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Matters of implementation can be further simplified: Since the numeric order of the
number y(f) given by (13) is the same as the lexicographic order on the truncated
sequence y˜(f) = ((−1)if (i)(a))ti=0, we can more conveniently work in practice with the
vector representation y(f), although the formal convergence argument for the fictitious
play algorithm is established in the standard setting over the reals, a we can use y(f) in
theory.
In other words, we use the real value y(f) and ≤-relation on the payoffs in theory,
while working with (the truncated) vector-version y˜(f) and ≤lex relation in practice,
when running FP. Convergence then follows from Robinson’s results [11].
Having assured convergence of fictitious play by switching back to numeric approxi-
mate representations y(f) of distribution functions f , it remains to establish the correct-
ness of the approximate equilibrium returned by the so-modified algorithm. This easily
follows from what we have obtained so far:
Informally : A strategy profile is an “approximate” equilibrium in the game
with hyperreal (distributional) payoffs Fij , if and only if it is an equilibrium
in the game over the reals, using y(fij) ∈ R as given by (13) in its payoff
structure.
“⇒”: Let p∗ = (p∗1, . . . ,p∗n) be a Nash-equilibrium (in mixed strategies) in the n-
person game with distribution-valued payoff distribution functions Fi(pi,p
∗
−i). To ease
notation, let us write fi(pi,p
∗
−i) to mean the respective density function. Since p
∗
i is an
equilibrium strategy for player i, we have ∀i∀p : Fi(p∗i ,p∗−i)  Fi(p,p∗−i). Since both
sides are themselves distribution functions, corollary 3.6, tells that their approximate
representatives satisfy y(fi(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i)) ≤ y(fi(p,p∗−i)).
“⇐”: Conversely, if y(fi(p∗i ,p∗−i)) ≤ y(fi(p,p−i)), then we may distinguish two cases:
1. An identity y(fi(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i)) = y(fi(p,p
∗
−i)) implies that the respective Taylor-poly-
nomial (approximations) are also identical, and thus the density fi(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) is
identical to the density fi(p,p
∗
−i). Hence, Fi(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i)  Fi(p,p∗−i) in particular.
2. Strict inequality y(fi(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i)) < y(fi(p,p
∗
−i)), however, implies Fi(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) 
Fi(p,p
∗
−i) by corollary 3.6, as before.
We may thus conclude that an approximate Nash-equilibrium can be computed by
fictitious play through a double approximation:
1. We approximate the unknown (real) payoff distribution by a Gaussian kernel den-
sity estimator and truncate all the payoff estimators at the same value a.
2. We fit a Taylor-polynomial of order t at x = a to enable the decision of the ≺-
relation on the approximation by use the the vector of derivatives (−1)i · f (i)(a)
for i = 0, 1, . . . , t.
Remark 3.7 We stress that the above arguments are not a theorem so far, as the quality
of approximation of the resulting Nash equilibrium compared to the theoretically exact
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result remains undetermined. Indeed, both, the kernel density estimate and the Taylor
polynomial get more and more accurate the more points we sample (for the kernel density)
or the more derivatives we take into account (for the Taylor approximation). A precise
error estimate, however, is involved and beyond the scope of this current article (subject
of future investigations). Hence, we refrain from calling the last findings a “theorem” or
similar here. Still, it must be emphasized that this double approximation can be made
arbitrarily accurate, where  is decided.
Discrete Distributions To handle discrete distributions, we can “abuse” the kernel
density estimators in a straightforward fashion, as the effect of incorporating more and
more samples at few fixed positions leads to a set of Dirac-masses accumulating at exactly
the points of the support. Somewhat roughly speaking, this causes no immediate harm,
since the likelihood Pr(X ≤ k) = ∑ki=0 Pr(X = i) can quite well be approximated by
integrating Gaussian densities from 0 to k, provided that the bell curve has its mass
centred slightly left of the integer point (say, half-spaced between the integers), so that
almost all the probability mass concentrates between two integers (this is somewhat
similar to an empirical histogram, with the exception that it creates Dirac-masses instead
of bars in the diagram).
The so-far sketched method thus remains applicable.
3.4 Implementation Hints for Algorithm 1 – Overview
As we noticed above, the implementation of algorithm 1 cannot be done plainly and
using the decision method sketched in section 2. Instead, the following adaptations
require a careful implementation:
1. Use Gaussian kernel density estimators to approximate the actual payoff distribu-
tion functions.
2. Fix a common cutoff point a and truncate all distributions in the entire payoff
matrix at the value a.
3. Fix an order t and compute Taylor-polynomial approximations for all payoff dis-
tributions at the point x = a. To represent an (approximate) distribution in
the payoff matrix, use the vector of derivatives with alternating signs (as defined
before).
4. Implement algorithm 1 as it stands, using corollary 3.6 to perform the-comparisons
(on the approximate representatives of the true payoff structure). The pointwise
additions of densities herein can be applied just as they are to the vectors of
derivatives instead (thanks to the linearity of the differentiation operators).
3.5 The case of d > 1 security goals
Our presentation here is directly adapted from [8]: given a two-player multi-objective Γ
and its auxiliary game Γ as specified in [6], we first need to cast Γ into zero-sum form
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to make FP converge. To this end, recall that player 1 in Γ, who is player 0 in Γ, has
d goals to optimize, each of which is represented as another opponent in the auxiliary
game Γ. We define the payoffs in a compound game (“one-against-all”, where the “one”
is the defender, against “all” (hypothetical) adversaries) from the payoffs in Γ, while
making the scalar payoffs vector-valued to achieve the zero-sum property:
• player 0:
u0 : PS1 ×
d∏
i=1
PS2→Rd,
u0(s0, . . . , sd) := (u
(1)
1 (s0, s1), u
(2)
1 (s0, s2), . . . , u
(d)
1 (s0, sd))
• i-th opponent for i = 1, 2, . . . , d:
ui = (0, 0, . . . , 0,−u(i)1 , 0, . . . , 0). (14)
Obviously, the “vectorization” of the opponents payoffs leaves the set of equilibria un-
changed.
3.5.1 Prioritization of Security Goals
To numerically compute (one of) the MGSS, [3] prescribes to scalarize the multiobjective
game into a single-objective game. Indeed, this scalarization is primarily for technical
reasons and can be made arbitrary (under suitable constraints). However, it this degree
of freedom in the choice on the scalarization allows us to prioritize the security goals
of player 0: To each of his d goals, we assign a weight α01, . . . , α0d > 0 subject to the
condition that
∑d
i=1 α0i = 1.
With these weights, the payoffs after scalarization are:
• for player 0: f0 = α01u1 + α02u2 + · · ·+ α0dud,
• for the i-th opponent, where i = 1, 2, . . . , d
fi = α01 · 0 + α02 · 0 + · · ·+ α0,i−1 · 0 + α0i · (−u(i)1 ) + α0,i+1 · 0 + α0d · 0
= −α0i · u(i)1 (15)
Concluding the transformation, we obtain a scalar compound game
Γsc = ({0, 1, . . . , d} , {PS1, PS2, . . . , PS2︸ ︷︷ ︸
d times
}, {f0, . . . , fd}) (16)
from the original two-person multiobjective Γ with payoffs u
(1)
1 , . . . , u
(d)
1 that can directly
be plugged into expressions (14) and (15).
Towards a numerical computation of equilibria in Γsc, we need yet another transfor-
mation due to [12]: for the moment, let us consider a general compound game Γc as a
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collection of d two-person games Γ
(1)
c , . . . ,Γ
(d)
c , each of which is played independently
between player 0 and one of its d opponents. With Γc, we associate a two-person game
Γcr that we call the reduced game. The strategy sets and payoffs of player 0 in Γcr are
the same as in Γc. Player 2’s payoff in the reduced game is given as the sum of payoffs
of all opponents of player 0 in the compound game Γc.
Lemma 3.8 ([12]) A fictitious play process approaches equilibrium in a compound game
Γc, if and only if it approaches equilibrium in its reduced game Γcr.
So, it suffices to consider the reduced game Γscr belonging to Γsc. It is a trivial matter
to verify the following fact (by substitution).
Lemma 3.9 The reduced game Γscr of the scalarized compound game Γsc defined by
(16) is zero-sum.
So by the convergence of FP in any zero-sum game (theorem 3.2), we obtain the final
correctness result on FP when being applied to our (d + 1)-person game Γsc that will
deliver the sought MGSS:
Theorem 3.10 The scalarized compound game Γsc defined by (16) has the fictitious
play property.
3.5.2 The Full Procedure
Theorem 3.10 induces the following procedure to compute MGSS according to definition
3.1:
Given a two-player multi-goal Γ with d payoffs u
(1)
1 , . . . , u
(d)
1 for player 1 (and possibly
unknown payoffs for player 2), we obtain an equilibrium in an MGSS along the following
steps:
1. Assign strictly positive weights α01, . . . , α0d, satisfying
∑d
i=1 α0i = 1, to each goal,
and set up the scalarized auxiliary compound game Γsc by virtue of expressions
(14), (15) and (16).
2. Run fictitious play (algorithm 1) in Γsc, stopping when the desirable precision of
the equilibrium approximation is reached.
3. The result vector x is directly the sought multi-criteria security strategy, whose
assurances are given by the respective expected payoffs of the opponents (equation
(10) in connection with the output y of the algorithm).
A few remarks about this method appear in order:
• The reduced scalarized game Γscr is a purely theoretical vehicle to establish con-
vergence of FP in the scalarized (formerly multiobjective) multiplayer game Γscr.
Thus, FP is to be executed on Γscr by copying and adapting lines 15 until 19 (incl.)
in algorithm 1 for each hypothetical adversary.
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• Convergence of the game is guaranteed only on the Taylor-polynomial approxima-
tions for the densities y(fij), but not on the true densities fij as such (for these,
the arguments about convergence failure discussed around equation (11) and illus-
trated in example 3.4 remain intact).
• The obtained bounds vup and vlow also refer to the Taylor-polynomial approx-
imations for the respective bounds on the actual value v of the game over the
distribution-valued payoffs. Thus, the actual assurance limits (distributions Vi
given by equation (5) in definition 3.1) must be computed from the resulting mixed
strategies (as specified in algorithm 1, line 23, i.e., the formula should be imple-
mented for all d goals).
• FP on the multiplayer game does not deliver a concrete (Pareto-Nash) equilib-
rium strategy for the (single) physical adversary, but returns worst-case behavior
strategy options for every of his d goals. Thus, the result may pessimistically un-
derestimate what happens in reality (as the true adversary is forced to choose a
single out of the multiple options, thus necessarily deviating from some of the d
equilibrium strategies).
4 Summary and Outlook
Implementing the theoretical concepts introduced in [6] requires care to avoid a variety
of subtle difficulties. While using Epanechnikov-kernel based density estimates greatly
eases matters of plain payoff distribution -comparisons, such models are not useful at
all for computing multi-goal security strategies. For these, it is practically advisable
to use Gaussian kernels, being truncated at a common point. At first, this avoids
paradoxical results (as outlined in section 2.5), but furthermore enables the application
of conventional fictitious play. With example 3.4 demonstrating the failure of FP on
∗R when implemented plainly, the algorithm can nevertheless be successfully applied
to proper approximations of the game matrices. In particular, a double-approximation
is applied here, where the first stage approximates the unknown true distribution by
a kernel density estimate, and the second stage is a Taylor-polynomial expansion at
the tails of the distribution. Despite this approximation performing possibly badly in
areas of low damage (cf. figure 4), it provides a good account for the tail-dependent
comparison that  is based on. In other words, even though the Taylor-polynomial
is not accurate everywhere on the relevant interval of possible losses, it nevertheless
produces correct -preferences as these depend on the tails of the distribution, where the
Taylor-approximation is indeed quite accurate. The practical benefit lies in the ability
of running conventional fictitious play on the so-approximated distribution models, after
casting the game-matrix of distributions into a regular game matrix over the reals.
With the algorithmic aspects being covered in this report, companion (follow up) work
will discuss the modeling and treatment of advanced persistent threats, and how to apply
our algorithms to distributions with fat, heavy or long tails (all of which can be fed back
into our algorithms after truncation, to mention one quick-and-easy solution).
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